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JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1960
ONE YEAR REVIEW OF WILLS, ESTATES AND TRUSTS
By WILLIAM P. CANTWELL
Member of the Denver firm of Holland & Hart
Etching in of certain fiduciary obligations in various aspects of
estate administration highlighted the 1959 case law developments
in the wills, estates and trusts field.
Canaday v. Kauffman1 involved the conduct of an intestate ad-
ministration by the decedent's widow. This case presented an
interesting analysis of various fiduciary obligations, and resulted
in a complete affirmance of the holdings below. Among the issues
raised were the fee awarded the administratrix, her failure to pay
rent on estate realty occupied by her, her failure to comply with
statutory requirements on the filing of reports, her failure to invest
liquid funds, and her reimbursement of herself for funds she used to
repay a loan made to the estate to operate a farm. A number of
minor issues were also raised. The trial court held in favor of the ad-
ministratrix on all of the issues. Affirmance by the Supreme Court
might appear to establish certain dangerous precedents. However,
it should be noted that the court carefully indicated that no loss of
any substance had occurred; and that, in some of the situations,
even though more experienced fiduciaries might have been expected
to administer the estate differently, that it would not differ with a
trial court which was satisfied with this particular administration
after careful inquiry into the circumstances. Because of this, the
case would appear to be best treated as limited to its own facts, and
not as granting a broad charter to fiduciaries in other estates.
The conclusion suggested concerning the Canaday case is but-
tressed by In re Estate of Jefferson2 which affirmed the county
court's removal of an administrator. The issue before the Supreme
Court was whether the administrator's acts were merely dilatory,
and therefore insufficient as grounds for removal, or whether there
was more than this, amounting to what the county court described
as ". . . general confusion and mismanagement of the estate." The
Supreme Court affirmed the county court, although it altered its
original opinion 3 somewhat on rehearing. The acts of the removed
fiduciary in Jefferson involved late filing of the inventory, failure
to file reports until ordered to do so by the court, sale of realty
without court authority, and ". . . a general lack of regard by
the fiduciary of the orderly procedure in handling estate running
completely through his administration . . ." Perhaps a signpost as
to the difference between Canaday and Jefferson is suggested in the
portion of the county court's opinion, cited by the Supreme Court,
which points out that: "The Administrator has shown a total dis-
regard for the procedures required of a fiduciary, and this in spite
of the fact that he is an attorney at law and is familiar with such
duties."' 4
1 342 P.2d 1027 (Colo. 1959).
2 344 P.2d 179 (Colo. 1959).
3 11 Colo. Bar Ass'n Adv. Sh. 530 (1959)-
4 344 P.2d at 180. (Emphasis supplied).
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Clarification of the obligation to notify persons whose sub-
stantial rights may be adversely affected, even in proceedings sub-
sequent to probate, is offered in Michels v. Clemens.5 Decedent
created a legal life estate in his wife, with the remainder to his
children, but attached a condition to the remainder in favor of the
plaintiff-in-error. On the death of the life tenant, defendant-in-
error instituted final settlement proceedings without notice to
plaintiff-in-error, and caused a decree to be entered under which
she became vested with the entire residue. The decree recited
plaintiff-in-error's failure to perform the conditions, even though
they had in fact been performed. It was held that statutory require-
ments for service of process in probate matters6 contemplated
affirmative notice to this plaintiff-in-error and that failure to give
such notice was so flagrant a violation of due process that it
rendered the decree subject to direct or collateral attack and
without effect as res judicata.
The attempt of an executor to recover assets withdrawn from
a joint bank account shortly before the death of one of the joint
tenants failed in Dickson v. Snyder.7 The executor urged that the
joint tenancy was created to pass the money in violation of the
statute of wills, but neither the trial court nor the Supreme Court
found any foundation for such a theory, and instead determined
that a valid gift inter vivos had been involved.
An interesting construction problem was presented in State
v. Rogers.8 Decedent created a life interest in a testamentary trust
for a daughter with remainder to her children and more remote
issue, or, alternatively, to her brothers or their issue. The life tenant
left no issue, but did leave a will disposing of her assets, including
her reversion in the trust. Both brothers predeceased their sister,
leaving no issue surviving them. The testamentary trustee paid
assets to the escheat fund of Colorado, and it claimed no interest
in those it received, nor in a mining claim that remained in the
name of the trustee. Conflicting claims were presented by a great-
niece of the decedent who asserted she was his sole heir, and by the
takers under the life tenant's will. The initial question was the date
of determination of heirs of a partially testate decedent in the
absence of an affirmative intent appearing in the will. The Supreme
Court followed the weight of authority and held that decedent's
death was the controlling date in such cases, and determined that
no affirmative contrary intent appeared. It then proceeded to de-
termine that the decedent died intestate as to the remainder which
thereby fell to his heirs determined as of the date of his death. This
meant, under the fact situation, that the life tenant could actually
pass the property under her will since at her death she was the
sole heir of the class composing decedent's heirs living at his death.
Attorneys seeking fees for services which "benefit" an estate
are offered further documentation of the principles involved by In
re Coors Estate.9 Coors held that attorneys representing a party
unsuccessfully urging probate of ink and pencil notations and dele-
5342 P.2d 693 (Colo. 1959).
6Colo. Rev. Stat. §152-1-11(
3
)(€)(1953).
7 340 P.2d 125 (Colo. 1959).
8 344 P.2d 1073 (Colo. 1959).
9 344 P.2d 184 (Colo. 1959).
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tions on a will were not conferring benefit on the estate, but only
on their own client. In view of this, the trial court's denial of the
petition for fees was affirmed by the Supreme Court.
In other developments, a series of cases further documented
existing precedents and rulings. For example, Robinson v. Tubbs'°
involved the settled" principle that a life tenant's interest is subject
to the burdens of liens, taxes and encumbrances in the absence of
an express contrary intent. Igo v. Marshall12 likewise dealt with
settled law in the undue influence field and found the Supreme
Court again indicating that any presumption arising out of a confi-
dential relationship may be overcome by evidence. The cy pres
doctrine received application in National Ass'n of Cerebral Palsy,
Inc. v. United Cerebral Palsy Ass'n"' in a classic case involving a
determination that an active alternative beneficiary was better
qualified to carry out the testatrix' intent than was the defunct
named beneficiary. The Scott 14 and Restatement 15 rule on con-
structive trusts in situations involving wrongful acquisition of
title to realty by one party with the funds of another was followed
in Askins v. Easterling.16 Similarly, the Restatement 17 was relied
on in Gruenwald v. Mason" to hold that no constructive trust
arises from a presumed transfer of realty on an oral trust in the
absence of a memorandum, a confidential relationship or a security
motive.
Finally, a valid separation and property settlement agreement
was held effective to bar a contest by the surviving spouse in
Thomas v. Eaton 9 after it was determined that the widow's allega-
tions were not sustainable on the facts.
10 344 P.2d 1080 (Colo. 1959).
11 Cf. Dormer v. Walker, 101 Colo. 20, 69 P.2d 1049 (1937).
12 345 P.2d 724 (Colo. 1959).
13 346 P.2d 582 (Colo. 1959).
14 4 Scott, Trusts, § 462 (2d ed. 1956).
15 Restatement, Restitution § 160 (1937).
16 347 P.2d 126 (Colo. 1959).
17 Restatement, Trusts § 44 (1) (1935).
18 335 P.2d 879 (Colo. 1959).
19 138 Colo. 512, 335 P.2d 270 (1959).
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